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“Saper la mente della soa Beatitudine”: Pope Paul II and the
ambassadorial community in Rome (1464–71)
Paul M. Dover
Kennesaw State University

Cet article examine la pratique des ambassadeurs envoyés par les états italiens à la
cour du pape Paul II (1464–71), en se concentrant en particulier sur la façon dont ils
ont assumé leur rôle d’informateur. Puisque Paul était un pape instable, impénétrable
et souvent inaccessible, les ambassadeurs ont souvent été dans l’obligation d’obtenir des
informations au sujet du pape et de ses intentions de manière indirecte. En s’appuyant
largement sur la correspondance diplomatique romaine durant le pontificat de Paul, cet
article montre comment les ambassadeurs se sont construit des réseaux de contacts au
sein même de la cour papale afin de s’assurer un apport continu d’informations utiles et
ce, en temps voulu. Ces réseaux comptaient donc des membres de toute la communauté
évoluant autour de la papauté, incluant des cardinaux bien placés, des fonctionnaires
ecclésiastiques, d’autres ambassadeurs, des agents politiques, aussi bien que plusieurs
informateurs des hiérarchies inférieures. Rome était, en effet, un marché de l’information,
si bien que les ambassadeurs devaient utiliser toutes leurs compétences pour entrer en
possession des informations les meilleures et les plus précieuses.

A

mbassadors at the papal court in the fifteenth century, charged with gauging
and reporting the actions, mood, and intent of the pontiff, faced a host of
challenges. Popes learned the game of deliberately limiting access to themselves,
parrying inquiries and attention with a succession of complicit ecclesiastical officials or cardinals. They also variably and intentionally restricted and opened up
access to consistorial meetings according to their own political whims. This meant
that ambassadors keen on “knowing the mind of the pope” (saper la mente della
soa beatitudine), as one ambassador put it, were forced to canvass other members
of the papal court and the broader Roman community to acquire the information
desired by their employers. This essay explores the particular tribulations that faced
ambassadors in carrying out such tasks, focusing on the understudied pontificate
of the Venetian Paul II (b. 1417, r. 1464–1471). It depicts the distinctive social and
political topography of the papal court as a series of concentric spheres emanating
from the pope at the centre, with a large number of individuals in various offices
Renaissance and Reformation / Renaissance et Réforme 31.3, Summer/été 2008
3

RenRef31-3.indd 3

3/27/09 6:59:36 PM

4 Paul M. Dover

at incremental levels of remove from the pope himself. The successive layers were
inhabited by cardinals, curial officials, resident ambassadors, short-term envoys,
and an innumerable body of ecclesiastics, Roman nobles, financiers, merchants,
literati, servants, and hangers-on who served as conduits for information and
indirect avenues for accessing the intentions of the pope. It should be stressed that
these spheres were far from uniform, fluctuating in size, shape, and content, and
the divisions between them permeable.1
The focus here on Paul II allows the examination of a number of difficult challenges for resident ambassadors. Paul was an inscrutable and notoriously prickly
personality whose famously poor reputation in humanist circles was echoed in
the observations of ambassadors and other statesmen. Quick to take offence, and
obsessed with the prestige of both himself and the papacy, Paul passed unloved and
unmourned. Here we address the question of what ambassadors were to do when
faced with such a difficult pope.
A considerable body of scholarship has demonstrated that the gathering of
information was the primary task of the resident embassies that gradually became
the default form of diplomatic representation between the major Italian states in the
second half of the fifteenth century.2 The Roman court by this time was the most
important court in Europe, a centre for both diplomatic and ecclesiastical politicking. Letters and visitors arrived from all over Europe and the Mediterranean and
provided a panorama of the world outside of Rome. The ambassadors stationed there
were expected, according to the instructions of the Duke of Milan to his envoys
in Rome, to act with “ears strained and eyes peeled to ascertain everything … and
inform us about it all.”3 Every individual sent to Rome as a resident ambassador
during Paul’s pontificate sought to elicit a response similar to the one offered by
the Duke of Modena, Borso d’Este, to his ambassador there in 1468, Jacopo Trotti:
“You write of so many things that we can almost say that we are in Rome ourselves,
so distinctly and neatly do you write about them … we commend you for your
writing because you have given us so much context that we cannot believe it, for
you describe them such that we touch them and hear them as if we were present.”4
Jacopo Trotti was one (according to another observer) “from whom you hear the
raw and the cooked (el cocto et el crudo) about happenings both inside and outside
Italy.”5 Resident ambassadors stationed at Rome were thus expected to pursue the
personal, knowing, as much as was possible, the mind of the pope; but also the
global, providing a view of a far broader scene linked to Rome through multifarious
connections.
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While keeping this second, global view in mind, this essay will focus on the
first of these charges: knowing the mind of the Pope Paul II, and, if at all possible, influencing it. It should be emphasized that this was not simply a function
of securing audiences with the pope, or observing and interacting with the pope
in public meetings of the Consistory. It also meant calling upon other inhabitants
of the social space of the Roman court, a space inhabited by a wide spectrum of
influential and knowledgeable individuals other than the pope himself. This was
especially imperative given the inaccessibility, unpredictability, and indecision of
this particular pope. A good resident ambassador’s dispatch was an account of all
that he had learned from his interactions not only with the pope, but with cardinals,
ambassadors, and others.6 He was to engage in numerous daily conversations with
dozens of individuals, and from those interactions know the mind of the pope and
piece together a composite picture of events in Rome and beyond.

In 1438 the humanist Lapo da Castiglionchio, at that time in the household of
Cardinal Condulmer, wrote a dialogue entitled On the Benefits of the Curia. The work,
finished while Lapo was at the Council of Ferrara, depicts an imagined dialogue
between the author and his friend Angelo da Recanate. Angelo urges Lapo to leave
Rome as a locale unfit for a humanist, but Lapo feels compelled to convince his
interlocutor otherwise. Lapo embarks on a systematic examination of the benefits
of residing at the Curia, in so doing describing in detail many features of life there.
At one point, he offers the following:
When Homer wanted to portray the prudent man in the person of Ulysses, he
wrote as follows: “Having been cast onto various shores, he came to know the cities
and customs of many peoples;” (Odyssey, I.3–4) that is, Homer denoted the same
things [mentioned earlier] by the length of wandering and variety of places and
men. I never thought that for the sake of pursuing this most precious thing [i.e. this
virtue], anyone—like Ulysses—had to seek out Calyps, Circes, the Phaeacians, the
Laestrygones, the Sirens, the Cyclops, and Hades. After all, what he gained by long
wandering and with extreme danger to his life—well, the Roman Curia will offer
you all of it in abundance. There, together, you would find a multitude of things, a
variety of men, and a great number of inducements. For among Christians almost
nothing of great importance is done on which the pope is not consulted or in which
his authority is not in some way involved. Whether it is a deliberation concerning
war, peace, or striking treatises, or marriages among the greatest kings and princes
of the world, or even if it concerns some controversy that occurs among these great
leaders, all things are deferred to the pope, and they are all discussed in the Curia as
if it were a kind of public forum. This is why it is inevitable that whoever is involved
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in such frequent contact with men and affairs sees many things, hears many things,
learns many things, and also himself does many things. He takes advantage of the
talk, conversation, and social interaction of many men—and these are men who are
not common or unlearned—and he knows the customs and manners of living of
many and forms acquaintanceships and friendships besides. From all these things,
he is granted the power of approving and disapproving what he wishes, of choosing
and rejecting, of letting go and taking back, as well as the power of correcting and
emending. The result is that even if he is by nature somewhat dim-witted—and as
long as he is not negligent—after being worn down and broken in for a while in the
Curia, he often conquers men of the highest cleverness.7

Lapo’s depiction of the Roman Curia as a beehive of activity and as a locale that
necessarily instructs its residents through their experiences there would have been
familiar to fifteenth-century ambassadors stationed in Rome. They might not have
shared Lapo’s high praise for those present at the papal court, nor his assessment
of the Ulyssean benefits accorded by the Curia, but his depiction of a community
where one “sees many things, hears many things, [and] learns many things” would
have rung true to any resident ambassador in Rome. So too would have been Lapo’s
placement of the pope at the centre of all these goings-on. For such resident ambassadors, the pope himself was inevitably the hub of their own activities and attention,
the focal point of political and ecclesiastical decision-making.
Getting access to this central figure was made more important by gradual
changes in the office of the papacy and the Curia in the second half of the fifteenth
century. Throughout the Middle Ages, the papacy and its actions had been governed
by the individual who occupied it: his provenance and allegiances, his priorities,
and perhaps most importantly, his personality. The fifteenth century, however, saw
a transformation that Walter Ullman highlighted in his history of the medieval
papacy: “it was the personalities of the popes which counted and set the tone … It
was no longer the impersonal office with its powers that was determinative, but the
personal character of the individual pope, his ‘humanity’—precisely the axiom which
papal ideology from the mid-fifth century onwards had strenuously and successfully
denied.” Ullman described it as a “reversal of pope and papacy.”8 This move toward the
personal paralleled the increased focus of the popes on political matters rather than
the spiritual and sacerdotal and, to a degree, on local rather than universal concerns.
Popes increasingly functioned as temporal princes, expending considerable time and
resources to reassert control over wayward papal vassals and vicariates and filling
curial offices and the College of Cardinals mostly with politically well-connected
Italians. The latter was an important part of the process by which the Curia was
“Italianized,” a tendency that would only intensify in the sixteenth century.9
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The political culture of the Roman Curia had long been unique, unlike that
of any other court in Italy, or anywhere else in Europe for that matter. At any given
time, there was a highly complex mix of personnel present there, a combination
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Roman Church, ambassadors and envoys
from all over Europe and beyond, and an incalculable number of hangers-on
and miscellaneous individuals. The papal household alone numbered well into
the hundreds.10 The court itself was a beehive of politicking, horse-trading, and
advocacy. A recent treatment of papal Rome in the early modern period has called
the city a “political laboratory.”11 “Rome was an open space, a meeting point for
family ascents, a financial centre capable of mobilizing intense economic resources
and a place of political decisions that interacted with the other centres of European
politics.”12 Given the remarkable diversity of people, contacts, and comings and
goings at the papal court in the fifteenth century, it should come as no surprise
that the reports of ambassadors resident there are astonishingly rich documents,
full of insights into the workings of the Church, the personalities of pontiffs and
prominent churchmen, and a bewildering array of social and political practices.
They are, without question, the best testimony we have to life in papal Rome in
the Renaissance. One of the Duke of Milan’s ambassadors wrote in 1457: “at the
court of Rome there are always envoys and ambassadors from the lords of the
world, who evidently have nothing better to do than keep an eye on what papers
are crossing the table.”13 What Maiolino Biasccioni, a Venetian historian-gazetteer
and author of l’Albergo, said for Rome in the seventeenth century, applies equally
to the Rome of Paul II: “Rome, as you know, is the place where all the news in the
world is found.”14
Getting as close as possible to the fulcrum of decision-making, whether it be
the prince or the most influential members of a republican oligarchy, was among the
primary aims of the resident ambassador in the fifteenth century. It was here that a
resident could best carry out his most important charge of gathering information.
It was no different in Rome: Nicodemo Tranchedini, a long-serving ambassador of
the Duke of Milan, remarked that an ambassador seeking answers was best off going
to the pope himself, adding, “I do not know anywhere better to go for water than
to the fountain.”15 Renaissance popes were frequently inscrutable or inaccessible
for diplomats, but certain facets of Paul’s personality and mode of rule meant that
water from this fountain was often unattainable or unreliable. This reality made
ancillary sources of information more important. Ambassadors thus sought to draw
upon a large range of contacts and sources amid the complex social topography of
the Curia.
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Like all monarchical courts, the Curia revolved around the prince, with the
pope at the centre. Jacques Heers has described the social situation of the papal
court as an ensemble, with the members of the community unified by their dependence on the pope.16 As one departed from the centre, the layers represented the
increased distances of remove from, and influence on, the pontiff. The ambassador
sought to inhabit, as much as possible, regions close to the centre, but there was
a recognition that individuals closer to the periphery might nonetheless prove
influential or useful.

Pietro Barbo was born in 1417, into one of the Venetian Republic’s patrician families. The Barbo were a small but influential and well-connected clan, which derived
significant income from important ecclesiastical benefices. Initially, at least, the
young Barbo was intended for a career in commerce. Instead, under the guidance
of his uncle, Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447), he embarked on a career in the church.
With the active support of Eugenius, he became archdeacon of Bologna and then
bishop, sequentially, of Cervia and of Vicenza. He was elevated to cardinal-deacon
of Santa Maria Nuova in 1440 at age 23. Under Pope Nicholas V (r. 1447–1455), he
became the cardinal of San Marco. He observed four papal administrations, enjoying varying degrees of influence and generally looking out for the interests of his
native Venice at the Curia. At the time of his own election as Pope in 1464, he had
already been a cardinal for some 24 years.17
Paul II is perhaps the least studied of the post-Constance fifteenth-century
popes, certainly in comparison to those between whom he was sandwiched: Pius II
(r. 1458–1464), the most interesting man ever to be pope; and Sixtus IV (r. 1471–1484),
patron of humanists and avid architect of the papal monarchy. Certainly Paul
was widely disliked by contemporaries, as a man whose attitudes, ambitions, and
personality traits made him unpopular in many circles. History’s view of Paul II
as pope has been shaped in important ways by the many unkind words about him
penned by the humanist historian Bartolomeo Sacchi (1421–1481), better known
as Platina, who was a member of the Roman Academy accused of fomenting a
conspiracy against the pope in 1468.18 He was arrested and cruelly tortured in the
Castello Sant’Angelo, and Platina’s bitterness is evident throughout his account of
Paul’s pontificate in his Lives of the Popes (completed in 1474 or 1475), written as a
pièce de revanche. Platina paints a picture of a haughty, vindictive, and vainglorious
pope who brooked absolutely no dissent. “I am pope, and I may do as I please,” he
reports the pope declaring.19 Platina’s Paul was obsessed with luxury and ceremony
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but penurious with his patronage. Platina resented the pope’s refusal to return the
money that he had paid for an office that Paul had taken away from him on his accession to the papacy—an office Platina assumed would assure him a comfortable
future.20 He was, according to Platina, morose and peevish, yet overly talkative
and changeable. Most damningly for the humanist Platina, Paul was “a great enemy
and despiser of human learning.”21 Other humanists echoed Platina’s assessment—
Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), after Paul’s death, wrote to Pope Sixtus IV of Paul’s
“incontinence, avarice and ambition.”22
Platina’s screed against the pope who had imprisoned, humiliated, and tortured
him should not be taken at face value as a portrayal of this fifteenth-century pontiff.
It is important to remember, as Vladimiro Zabughin has written, that “Platina depicts
a frightful picture of hypocrites and hypocrisy. He wishes at all costs to depict a duel
between himself and the pope as his personal enemy.”23 Considerable scholarship
has suggested that Paul was not nearly the enemy of learning that Platina made him
out to be, even if he did not patronize humanists to the extent both his predecessor
and successor did.24 Despite these caveats, Paul II ended up as perhaps the most
unpopular pope of the Renaissance period.
The roots of Paul’s unpopularity among ambassadors in Rome were actually
considerably more prosaic than the hyperbole of Platina would suggest. Three factors
above all others led to friction between the pope and the diplomatic community in
Rome. First, Paul was obsessed with the reassertion of papal sovereignty over the
many papal vassals and vicariates, and resisted sternly their attempts to align themselves with, or seek the protection of, the major Italian powers. As Paul’s priorities
were primarily political and territorial, it was inevitable that he would butt heads
with his Italian neighbors. The aspirations and actions of the Holy See were largely
“Italianized” and his attempts to reassert papal temporal control, especially in the
Romagna and Marches, were perceived as threatening by all other major Italian
states, even, and perhaps especially, by Venice.
Second, Paul’s highly autocratic conception of the papal monarchy created tensions. He marginalized the role of cardinals in decision-making, and clearly believed
that his will should be followed without question, an attitude that perturbed many
of his interlocutors. Neither of these tendencies was new or unique to Paul, of course,
but their prominence during his papacy was distressing to many in Rome.
Third, it is clear that the personality and personal habits of this pope were
the source of considerable consternation in the ambassadorial community. The
dispatches of ambassadors of various Italian states resident in Rome during Paul’s
pontificate indicate that not all of Platina’s invective was exaggeration. Many of the
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unpleasant personality traits Platina emphasized were precisely those ambassadors
in Rome repeatedly complained about. Let us now examine how these three factors
impacted the ambassadorial community.
Throughout his pontificate, Paul was deeply concerned with the extension and
consolidation of his temporal realm, where he sought to restore direct control over
the territories of the papal state. As Ian Robertson has emphasized: “a fundamental
premise of his temporal government seems to have been a conviction that every
opportunity should be exploited to bring back all the territories of the Papal States
under the direct government of the church.”25 According to the Milanese envoy
Giovanni Bianchi, Paul’s goal was to “subject all the lands of the church that are not
at the moment subjugated by him.”26 Paul expended a great deal of energy, starting
early in his pontificate, in seeking to re-assert papal dominion over the important
papal vicariate of Bologna, which jealously guarded its freedoms. The Cardinal of
Spoleto, Bernardo Eruli, told Jacopo Trotti that it was common knowledge that
the appetite of the pope “was to make himself lord of all of the Romagna.”27 The
recapture of Rimini, when Sigismondo Malatesta’s illegitimate son Roberto seized
the town despite an agreement that it would return to direct papal control upon his
father’s death, became an obsession for Paul, so much so that he (in the words of the
Duke of Milan), forgot his duties as a good pastor.28 Apart from a concerted effort,
supported by papal troops, that led to the return of Cesena to direct papal control
in 1465, Paul’s endeavours to reassert papal sovereignty over these territories were
largely unsuccessful, to the great annoyance and frustration of this pope.29
The pope also sought to reassert his role as the feudal lord of the king of Naples.
As a vassal of the papacy, the king depended on papal approval for his investiture as
monarch. Ferrante had bought the support of the preceding pope Pius II expensively
and Paul did not hesitate to call in his chips, expecting the king of Naples to demonstrate obedience to the will of the papacy. In the event, Ferrante showed himself
unwilling to restore vicariates such as Mondavio to papal control and also sought
to loosen feudal ties between the pope and fiefs in the Regno such as Pontecorvo,
the Duchy of Sora, and Terracina.30 Ferrante also actively opposed Paul’s efforts to
return Roberto Malatesta and Rimini to papal obedience. Jacopo Trotti commented
on how much Ferrante’s insubordination irked the pope: “I confess and believe
that he [Ferrante] is not doing as many things as the Holy Father says he is, but I
do say that the king has injured him to the heart and has shown him no respect at
all, which is the greatest injury that one can inflict on a Lord as prideful, pompous
and ambitious as is our pope.”31 In response to these slights, the pope engaged in
the dangerous game of openly encouraging John of Anjou to pursue his claim on
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the Kingdom of Naples—so much so that one ambassador labeled the pope “the
first brother and friend of duke John.” The possibility of an Angevin intervention
in Naples was a threat wielded by Paul throughout his papacy.
Paul’s ambitions for the extension of papal authority, in all its forms, were
much remarked upon by ambassadors in Rome. The Milanese ambassador Giovanni
Bianchi reported that “it is the opinion of many here, even of some cardinals, that
every plan, act and care of the pope seeks and tends to make and keep him the judge
of things in Italy and by consequence outside of Italy.” There was evidence, Giovanni
suggested, that Paul sought to be the dominus dominantum.32 Another Milanese
resident at the papal court, Agostino Rossi, seconded Giovanni’s assessment, saying
that the pope wanted to be the one to whom all allegiance was directed; he wanted
to impose laws on everyone, in both the spiritual and temporal realms.33 The pope,
he said simply, “wants to be obeyed.”34
Such talk, it must be pointed out, was typical in the fifteenth century, when
the papacy largely acted as just another player in the state system of the Italian
peninsula—and thus the political and territorial ambitions of the papacy could be
spoken of in the same fashion as were those of the king of Naples or the Republic
of Venice. Paul was not the only pope accused of seeking to dominate Italian
politics: the efforts of the Renaissance papacy to “fare grande la chiesa” led many
to sympathize with the words attributed to Lorenzo de’ Medici: “to me it would be
better to have three of four popes, instead of just one.”35 Still, there is no denying
that the considerable emphasis placed by Paul on reasserting papal authority, in the
temporal and spiritual realms, ruffled feathers.
This emphasis fed into Paul’s exalted view of the papal monarchy, which many
felt shaded into autocracy. Paul’s rule reflected the general trend of the age, whereby
“not only with regard to administration, but also—and even more—to politics and
diplomacy, the later fifteenth century saw ecclesiastical government being increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small palace committee, consisting of the pope
and a few close advisers.”36 The reconstruction of papal monarchical authority, in
which the College of Cardinals became largely vestigial to decision-making in Rome,
inevitably led to tensions and clashes, between the pope and the cardinalate and
between the pope and the Roman ambassadorial corps. Paul’s well-developed sense
of his own importance was fully consonant with such changes; he was a jealous
protector of papal power and privilege.
A rich, Venetian noble, about whom the chronicler Gaspare da Verona opined
that he was the handsomest man to serve as pope,37 Paul displayed some of the
haughtiness that was often attributed to Venetian patricians in the fifteenth century.
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Platina’s picture of a pontiff in love with money and yet parsimonious in parcelling it
out, while no doubt exaggerated, finds echoes in the dispatches of friendly and unfriendly ambassadors alike. Pius, in his Commentaries, on several occasions remarked
on Pietro Barbo’s love for worldly things as cardinal.38 The Venetian ambassador
Bernardo Giustiniani, despite being the representative of an allied state, denounced
the “intolerable pomp” of Paul II and sneered that “the pope spends all day counting
and sorting his money and polishing pearls rather than on pater nosters.”39
Respect for the dignity of the Throne of St Peter was paramount for Paul, and
observers did not hesitate to point out the dictatorial aspects of the pontiff’s rule.40
Paul was deliberate in his attempts to extend the papal monarchy restored by Martin V.
After Pius II’s issuing of the Execrabilis in 1460, the pontificate of Paul II was marked
by pro-papal juridical theorizing, a process that accelerated even more under Paul’s
successor, Sixtus IV.41 Again following the example of Pius, Paul rarely consulted
the community of cardinals in decision-making and instead relied on a limited
group of close advisers, which might include a small number of “cardinal prefects”
who were part of the familia of the Apostolic Palace. Ambassadors also complained
that the pope did not sufficiently take into account the preferences and desires of
their princes when he was deciding how to fill offices and dispense benefices. These
matters were of great importance to resident ambassadors in Rome, who lobbied the
pope to consider candidates favourable to their employers. Agostino Rossi wrote
on this matter that Paul never took into account the views of the emperor, king, or
any princes and lords.42
Paul was also very attentive to the more symbolic elements of his power. He
wore an extravagant tiara that was much talked about in Rome and commissioned
a great many representations of himself on medals and coins. “Paul II was firmly
persuaded that the pope ought to appear in a style befitting the highest position
on earth.”43 Such was the self-regard of the pope, one resident of the Roman court
noted, that “with this pope one must use honey rather than vinegar.”44
But just as nettlesome for ambassadors in Rome as these political and institutional factors were Paul’s personality and habits. There was much that was
enigmatic about Paul’s character, and his personality vexed and frustrated ambassadors, cardinals, and others who interacted with him at the papal court.45 These
personal idiosyncrasies inevitably had political repercussions. One way in which the
self-regard of the pope was reflected was his deliberately cultivated inaccessibility.
A pope “who does not give audiences to living people,” a newly arrived ambassador
remarked about Paul.46 Gaining audiences with the pope was a constant source of
frustration for ambassadors, who prized such opportunities to press their concerns.
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Paul held fewer consistories and granted fewer personal audiences than had been
customary in Rome. “It has now become three times as difficult to have an audience
as it was under Pope Pius,” an envoy from Breslau remarked.47 The complaints could
be heard within a few weeks of his coronation as pope. The Mantuan ambassador
Giovan Pietro Arrivabene remarked on Paul’s attitude towards audiences: “Already
many have begun to complain about this pope, who is universally unpleasant
and inhuman to everyone and, among other things, very difficult with audiences.”
Arrivabene stressed that the cardinals were especially displeased with the pope’s
expectation that they should come and go at the pope’s pleasure, describing him
as arrogant and disdainful. The ambassador speculated that within a few months
none of the cardinals would have any authority left.48
The strange hours that Paul kept as pope also occasioned complaint. He managed to change the entire timeframe of the papal court. Paul was a night owl, rising
late in the day, dining late, and conducting business well into the nighttime hours.
Bleary-eyed ambassadors lamented such habits, and complaints were voiced that
consistories and audiences occurred during the evening meal hours, leaving stomachs
growling. A German ambassador once remarked that “His Holiness no longer gives
audiences by day and as mine was the first, I sat in the pope’s chamber until 3 o’clock
in the morning.”49 Ambassadors had to become accustomed to being summoned
late into the night.50 Under Paul, consistories might begin well after sundown and
go until the early morning.51 Such nocturnal habits garnered him the nickname
cicindela, the glow worm; it was not meant kindly.52 Jacopo Trotti called the pontiff
a man who turns night into day.53
Not only were audiences with the pope too infrequent for the liking of ambassadors in Rome, but what they heard from the pope at such gatherings was rarely
satisfactory. When the pope did grant audiences or hold consistories, the complaint
was invariably that they went on too long, largely as a result of the pope himself
talking. The Milanese ambassador Otto da Caretto, commenting less than two
weeks into Paul’s pontificate, wrote that “the habit of His Holiness is to go on for
a very long time in his speech and without much order, such that it is very difficult
to report on his discussions in an orderly way.”54 Agostino Rossi in 1466 wrote of a
four-hour interview with the pope composed of “varied, long and numerous discussions about Italian matters.”55 Nicodemo Tranchedini called it the “usual way” for
the pope to go an at length about a subject.56 A meeting with the ambassadors of
the league of Florence, Milan, and Naples in 1467 went on for seven hours through
the night, lasting so long that the next morning the Venetian ambassadors were
convinced that some secret contract had been negotiated!57 Consistories were often
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just as long and could be especially taxing for ambassadors during the heat of Roman
summers. Jacopo d’Arezzo, an envoy of Marquis Ludovico Gonzaga, wrote that he
had spent so long in the consistory in such stifling heat that he was in no shape to
seek secret information.58 On more than one occasion Jacopo Trotti found himself
kneeling at the feet of the pope, growing steadily more miserable, his knees aching
as the pope launched into yet another lengthy pronouncement—he felt he would
die a thousand times from the heat.59
The loquaciousness of the pope was wedded to a tendency to launch into hyperbole. Paul II might take a great deal of time to come to reach decisions, but the
pope was unsparing with those who disagreed with his choices. Qui mecum non est,
contra me est, is how Jacopo Trotti described the rule of Rome under this pope.60
He took great umbrage at resistance to the absolute nature of papal authority. In
August 1467, the pope declared that he would sooner “become Jew or Turk” than
see the city of Forlì fall under Venetian protection.61
Ambassadors of Milan and Naples were often at the receiving end of the pope’s
tongue-lashings, as their princes pursued policies that aroused Paul’s ire. In public
and private, the pope vented his spleen against King Ferrante of Naples, whom he
called “that thieving bastard king.”62 In October 1469, Paul attacked Ferrante in a
barrage of resentment reported by the Milanese ambassador, Nicodemo Tranchedini.
The pope not only declared that it was impossible to trust Ferrante on account of
his malevolent nature, but he also claimed to know that King Alfonso was not really
Ferrante’s father, and that Pope Calixtus had, some years ago, informed him of the
real identity of the king’s parents.63 In September 1467, upset at the Duke of Milan’s
intransigence over financial exactions from ecclesiastics in the Milanese, Paul raged
against the Milanese and Neapolitan ambassadors. “I have never seen him so upset
or disturbed,” Agostino Rossi observed.64 The next few months saw the Milanese
ambassador regularly at the receiving end of diatribes from Paul—the ambassador’s
dispatches read as if written by a man under siege. Paul claimed that Agostino had
written “a thousand lies” in his dispatches to the Duke of Milan.65 This situation
reached its nadir in November, when the pope threatened to lock Agostino up in
the Castello Sant’Angelo.66
Things were no better for poor Lorenzo da Pesaro, who filled in as Milanese
ambassador when Agostino was absent from Rome in 1468. Lorenzo faced the fulminations of the pope in response to Galeazzo Maria Sforza’s refusal to join a general
peace without the participation of the king of France. The pope declared the Duke
a traitor and called him crazy. Lorenzo hardly dared to write back to Galeazzo with
this news and a fellow ambassador remarked that if he were in Lorenzo’s position
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he would try not to be seen by anyone. “In truth, everyone feels compassion for this
poor Messer Lorenzo,” Jacopo Trotti sympathetically observed.67 When faced with
such episodes of spleen venting by the pope, ambassadors acted as filters, seeking
to interpret the real meaning and intent of the pontiff’s words. “Do not get upset
about anything that the pope says to me against you … for he says and does much
worse to others,” Jacopo Trotti cautioned Borso d’Este.68
Ambassadors also wondered whether they could trust the pope’s words. Faced
with a garrulous yet indecisive pontiff, ambassadors in Rome found it difficult
to gauge the pope’s intentions. The pope rarely made decisions quickly, and he
regularly changed his mind, or at least changed his declared intentions. “I do not
know what he will do, because he does not take care of things quickly, and does
not come readily to conclusions,” wrote Jacopo Trotti in 1467.69 Agostino Rossi
echoed such an assessment a year earlier, when commenting on Paul’s attitude
toward various states joining a general league: “it seems to be a beautiful game [of
his] to stay indifferent and neutral like this, not showing himself to be here or there,
only in order to be master of all and to be able to bash one against the other.”70 He
echoed these sentiments just over a year later: “I do not know what to say except
that I am amazed by the great variation and mutation of this pope: one moment he
condemns the Venetians, the next he commends them; first he makes jokes about
the demands of Bartolomeo Colleoni, and now he wants to satisfy them; he stresses
that he wants to favor justice and your side, and now it appears to me he is more likely
to do the opposite.”71 Agostino, in 1468, described himself as having to navigate a
fluctuating sea, where the tide was constantly coming in and out. He made clear the
source of this undulant water: “It is true, my Lord, that our Holy Father has strange
and varied opinions.”72 Other ambassadors also remarked on how frustrating this
changeability was. Jacopo Trotti ended one of his letters with an admonition to
Borso d’Este: “As before, I tell you that one cannot put a great deal of trust in what
the pope says at this moment, as there are twelve hours in a day.”73 There was nothing that frustrated a resident ambassador more than such variability, as it made it
difficult to report reliable information, and to conjecture about the likely course
of events. Similar observations were made by Machiavelli when commenting on
the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian in 1509, a man, Machiavelli wrote, who “will
often undo in the evening what he has done in the morning”:
This makes legations to him difficult, because the most important duty of the envoy,
whether sent by a prince or a republic, is to conjecture the future through negotiations and incidents. After all, the envoy who conjectures wisely and conveys
his conjectures well to his government will assure his government the advantage,
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allowing it to take measures at an appropriate time. When the envoy conjectures
well, this honors the envoy and his government, but if he conjectures badly he and
his government are dishonored.74

In the case of Paul II, such indecision and changeability not only discomfited ambassadors, it had political repercussions, as Walter Tommasoli recognizes in his
assessment of Paul’s papacy: “[the pontificate] was listless and confused, which
reflected the indecisive nature of a pope who was at the same time a centralizer of
power.”75
For the purposes of the ambassadors, therefore, the words of the pope were
overabundant and too likely to change according to audience and circumstance; his
very credibility was questionable. The nature of the fifteenth-century court was such
that there was always suspicion that a prince was deliberately speaking in a manner
that was incomplete, misleading, or downright false; it was one of the tasks of the
resident ambassadors to gauge and assess the veracity of such words. Ambassadors
emphasized very regularly the disingenuous mode of speech and suspicious nature
of this pope. The Archbishop of Milan, Stefano Nardini, said of him shortly after
Paul’s election: “in truth this pope is of a very suspicious nature and while he makes
easy use of generous words towards you [Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan], I do not
yet know how well one can trust him.”76 “I have begun to take this opinion of His
Holiness,” Otto da Caretto wrote nearly two months after Paul’s election, “that he
has quite a skill of providing beautiful words that are without effect.”77 Lorenzo da
Pesaro, also writing to the Duke of Milan, echoed these words: “It is certain that
His Holiness speaks very well, but his words differ from the facts.”78 It would be
hard to conjure up a more delicate means of saying that the pope lied.

Resident ambassadors in Renaissance Rome spent a good deal of their time
pressing the flesh with cardinals, especially given the hurdles placed before them
by Pope Paul II. In fifteenth-century Italy, this group of men was an increasingly
politicized group that represented a cross-section of Italian politics. Cardinals were
officers of the Roman church but also semi-official representatives of their home
states. Some became cardinal-protectors, a term used loosely and infrequently
throughout the fifteenth century, where they were closely associated with the interests of their home state.79 Some served essentially as resident ambassadors in
their own right. An example of such a figure was Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga, the
son of Marquis Ludovico Gonzaga of Mantua. Elevated to the cardinalate by Pius
II, Francesco was ambivalent about what he could expect from Paul II, observing
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that the pope did not have a “good stomach for the Gonzaga.” 80 Although assisted
by a series of envoys sent to Rome, Cardinal Gonzaga acted as the de facto Mantuan
ambassador. Similarly, the French cardinals present in Rome—Jean Jouffroy, Jean
Balue, Alain de Coëtivy, and especially Guillaume d’Estouteville—fulfilled many
of the roles of resident ambassador for the king of France, and were actively sought
out by other ambassadors for news from France and the perspective of the French
king. This was especially the case because the king of France did not regularly keep
an ambassador resident in Rome.
Rivalries within the cardinalate mirrored those of the larger Italian political
scene, as cardinals jostled for position within the church, but also for political
and ecclesiastical advantage for their own lords. The advent of a new pope might
radically overturn the political position of a cardinal, turning favour into disfavour. Many of the cardinals who had been closest to Pius II, known as the Pieschi,
found themselves sidelined by Paul—most notable here were Niccolò Fortiguerra
(often called Teano in dispatches), Bartolomeo Roverella (usually called Ravenna),
Bernardo Eroli (Spoleto, or Spoletano), Francesco Gonzaga (Mantua), and Jacopo
Ammannati-Piccolomini (Pavia). While the first four of these ultimately established
tolerable relationships with the pope, Ammanati would remain one of the new pope’s
most consistent and ardent critics.81 He regularly offered aid and ideas to friendly
ambassadors, in particular those of Milan and Florence.82
At the beginning of Paul’s pontificate, many ambassadors expressed fears that
this Venetian pope would populate the ranks of the curial offices with Venetians;
Agostino Rossi feared that the new pope would become the “chaplain” of Venice,83
while on occasion the court would ring with warnings that the Venetians were
“becoming popes.” 84 In fact, while a number of Venetians assumed prominent roles,
they did not dominate the papal court. Nor did the administration of Paul II prove
particularly favourable toward the interests of the Venetian government. Paul did
end up elevating three Venetian relatives (Marco Barbo, Giovanni Battista Zeno,
and Giovanni Michiel) to the cardinalate, but there was no Venetian takeover, as
many had dreaded. In fact, instances of tension and disagreement with Venice
proved to be far more common under Paul than was concord; Venetian ambassadors at the Curia were often deeply unhappy and among those most critical of the
pope.85 The acrimony was particularly acute with the advent of the Rimini crisis,
in which papal expectations of political and military support from Venice against
Roberto Malatesta went unfulfilled. The Venetians proved totally uninterested in
contributing to an effort to consolidate papal control over a territory on Venice’s
front doorstep, especially at a time when they were under intense pressure from the
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Turks in the eastern Mediterranean. The Florentine ambassador Otto Niccolini’s
description of the relationship between the pope and Venice in April 1470 applied
to the rest of Paul’s pontificate: “in secret, there is little love, in fact there is quite
a bit of rancor.” 86
It is evident that under Paul II the number of cardinals whom the pope could
count as friends was small. Unsurprisingly, one of this group was his own nephew,
Marco Barbo, who was made the cardinal of San Marco in 1467. Marco had been
Bishop of Vicenza and master of Paul’s household when Paul was still a cardinal.
Jacopo Trotti described him as “the right eye of the pope” just after he became
cardinal.87 Once cardinal, Marco Barbo’s profile in Rome was further enhanced.
Gaspare of Verona, who wrote a largely laudatory account of Paul’s papacy, wrote
of the cardinal’s role alongside the pope: “Paul II is very well pleased to have added
him to the number of cardinals and to have confided difficult tasks to him, and
he constantly gives him more responsibilities of such a kind. He is certainly very
well endowed for important affairs … loyal and devoted to the supreme pontiff
Paul II.” 88
The relationship between the pope and a large portion of the College of
Cardinals was strained from the very beginning of Paul’s reign. The pope wasted
no time in rejecting the capitulations which the College of Cardinals had agreed
upon prior to electing him—these included arrangements for a church council
within three years, the fixing of the size of the College at 24 cardinals, and planning for war against the Turks.89 He had legal documents drawn up to show that
these stipulations did not apply to him as pope, forcing several reluctant cardinals
to consent to the revisions. He predictably rebuffed any calls for a church council,
recognizing in them the inherent threat to his authority. He also suspended the
financial arrangements for the Crusade, so beloved of Pius II. The mutual suspicion
that resulted did not fully dissipate in the years that followed: cardinals resented
Paul’s exalted conception of papal monarchical rule, and his desire to reassert
papal control over papal vassals and vicariates often threatened the interests of
their native states.
In practice, the social and political circles that built up around individual
cardinals meant that Rome was a city of many courts, not just one centred on the
pope. Giorgio Chittolini has stressed that we should think of the Roman court in
the broadest terms, encompassing the papal court, the Curia, and the households
of the cardinals.90 Some of the more prominent cardinals operated what amounted
to chanceries of their own, with dozens of letters coming in and going out every
day. Some of these letters might contain information of considerable interest to
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ambassadors resident in Rome, and their dispatches are full of references to letters
shown to them by individual cardinals or their secretaries.
One of the chief tasks of any resident ambassador in Rome was to establish a
reliable network of cardinal “friends,” who would provide information from consistories or other curial meetings to which access was limited; lobby and provide
access to influential personnel at the Roman court; and even advocate sympathetic
positions to the pope on the ambassador’s behalf. The references in ambassadorial
dispatches to cardinali amici, cardinali nostri, and cardinali partesani are legion.
The Este of Ferrara, for example, did not have a cardinal in Rome during the
pontificate of Paul II, and thus their ambassadors sought to establish useful relationships with cardinals resident in Rome for their influence, connections, and access
to information. Cardinals at Rome were referred to by a range of monikers by the
Estense ambassador Jacopo Trotti. Il Greco, or Niceno, was Cardinal Bessarion
Trapezentius, Rohanno was the French cardinal Guillaume d’Estouteville, Sancto
Angelo was Juan Carvajal, and San Marco was Marco Barbo. These connections
became valuable not only because they might provide insight into the deliberations inside the meetings of the Consistory and the viewpoints of the pope, but
also because they supplied news from a range of locales. Estouteville filled in the
ambassador on the latest information from France (providing the Estense ambassador with the “very freshest letters from France”91); Barbo discussed the latest
debates inside the Venetian Senate; Bessarion updated him with harrowing news
of the threat offered by the Turks in the East. Jacopo regarded certain cardinals as
particularly well disposed to the interests of Ferrara, most notably Juan Carvajal,
whom he referred to as nostro homo qui.92 Carvajal, unfortunately for Jacopo, had
a poor relationship with the pope.
Milanese ambassadors in Rome, as we have seen, often found themselves at
odds with the pope, given the frequently contentious relationship between the Duke
Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Paul II. Because the pontiff kept these ambassadors at
arm’s length, they were forced to rely on friendly cardinals for information and access,
usually Guillaume d’Estouteville (whom Antonio da Bracello referred to as nostro
compare93), Francesco Gonzaga, Angelo Capranica, and Jacopo Ammannati.94
These men were Pieschi and Paul II systematically sought to exclude them, Gonzaga
aside, from positions of influence in the Curia; there was considerable tension
between these men and the Pauleschi, the cardinals appointed by Paul himself.95
When Jean Balue, the Bishop of Angers, was elevated to the cardinalate by Paul II in
September 1467, Agostino Rossi wrote hopefully that he would prove a great asset
to the Milanese cause in the College of Cardinals.96

RenRef31-3.indd 19

3/27/09 6:59:37 PM

20 Paul M. Dover

Other than the cardinals, of course, there were a large number of other
ecclesiastics. The papal court was teeming with bishops, archbishops, notaries,
papal secretaries, and chancery officials—members of a vast service bureaucracy
hovering around the Holy See. In one regard, such officials could be more valuable
than cardinals as sources of information and influence, as they were not of such
high-profile and they could be consulted with more discretion. At the beginning of
every pontificate, resident ambassadors took stock of those appointed to prominent
and influential positions by the pope. There was a scurry to identify those who were
likely to look favourably upon the interests of the state or prince that the ambassador
was representing. We can see this in the dispatch of Otto da Caretto, the Milanese
representative in Rome at the outset of Paul’s reign, to Duke Francesco Sforza, in
which he listed dozens of appointees to curial offices, administrative positions (such
as castellans and podestà) in the papal states, and condottieri hired—a detailed
plan of the papacy’s new administrative staff.97
Among the most important of such officials in Paul’s Rome was Leonardo
di Piero Dati, a Florentine canon and Bishop of Massa who became the preferred
secretary of the pope. As early as a month after Paul’s election, ambassadors were
noting his favoured position alongside the pope.98 As a Florentine, he often offered
his services to Florentine ambassadors, although Lorenzo de’ Medici mistrusted
him intensely, calling him “a mortal enemy of the house of Medici.”99
Similarly, the Milanese ambassadors drew repeatedly on the service of the
archbishop of Milan, Stefano Nardini, a well-connected churchman who enjoyed the
favour of Paul II. Nardini, “ha buon loco” alongside the pope, according to Otto da
Caretto.100 Nardini regularly wrote letters to the Duke of Milan that complemented
those of the Milanese ambassadors. In November 1466, Agostino Rossi was under
considerable pressure from Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza, not known for his patience,
to secure the open bishopric of Albenga for the duke’s favored candidate. The pope,
however, insisted on awarding it to the Bishop of Savona, who had served the pontiff for
some 30 years, but who was a member of the Fregoso family, traditionally hostile to the
Sforza. In several audiences with the pope, Agostino reminded the pope of promises to
satisfy Milanese concerns, but the pope was unreceptive. Faced with such indisposition,
Agostino took his case to the prelati di casa (his description of those close to the pope),
which included Stefano Nardini, Marco Barbo (at that time, the Bishop of Vicenza
and not yet cardinal), and the Bishop of Tirasona. He then tried his luck with several
cardinals: Teano (Niccolò Fortiguerra), Pavia (Jacopo Ammannati-Piccolomini), and
Mantua (Francesco Gonzaga). All reiterated that it would be impossible to budge the
pope from his position, as it indeed proved to be.101
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The presence of envoys from all over Italy and Europe made Rome a window
on the wider world. Ambassadors in Rome, when they were not in audiences or
seeking information from cardinals and other curial officials, could often be found
interacting with one another. Waiting and biding time took up a large portion
of the day of resident ambassadors anywhere in fifteenth-century Italy—indeed,
boredom was one of the occupational hazards of the resident ambassador. But in
Paul II’s Rome, as we have seen, this took on an altogether new dimension; the
waiting could be endless. Ambassadors regularly agonized over waiting hours for
audiences that often never materialized. But ambassadors also sought to make use
of such periods of waiting, interacting with each other in their constant search for
information. Here they would press the flesh, share gossip, and exchange letters in
the hope of ascertaining useful information they could then pass on in their letters
home. There were always large numbers of people waiting around in the hopes
of seeing the pope or securing papal favour or funding. To provide but a single
example, Agostino Rossi and Lorenzo da Pesaro in January 1467 wrote of their
conversations on one day with Hungarian ambassadors hoping to secure a subsidy
for their struggle against the Ottomans; with the Grand Master of the Knights of
St John seeking relief from the order’s debt; with the Albanian captain Scanderbeg
seeking military assistance; and with condottieri hoping for new contracts—all
while waiting for an audience with the pope.102
Ambassadors also visited each other’s residences, where they might better
exchange letters or converse in private. Jacopo Trotti regularly visited the Venetian
house in Rome, where he learned of letters coming from Venice and beyond.103
Ambassadors’ residences were clustered in the heart of the city, thus providing
meeting places outside the more official milieus like the papal palaces. In February
1468, the ambassadors of Milan, Florence, and Naples all gathered at the Rome
residence of the Neapolitan ambassador, Garcia Betes, to read letters freshly arrived
from Florence and hear news from Naples, including a letter directed to the College
of Cardinals by Ferrante.104
The ambassadors of allied or friendly states were most likely to work together
or share information. In some cases, allied ambassadors would pen joint dispatches,
as, for example, did the ambassadors of the alliance between Florence, Milan, and
Naples. These letters would be signed oratori della lega, referring to the lega particolare
between these three states, and would supplement the letters of individual ambassadors in a sign of solidarity.105 Instructions to Milanese ambassadors sometimes
directed them to work as much as possible in unison with the envoys of their coalition partners, in order to present a unified front to the pope.106 These ambassadors
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also regularly presented themselves as a group to the pope for audiences, or sought
out the pope or his closest cardinals to present a joint proposal from the members
of the league. Similarly, during the papacy of Paul II, the ambassadors of Ferrara
habitually worked in tandem with their counterparts from Venice.
Ambassadors also made reference to a host of connections at the papal court
that remained unnamed—sources that provided ambassadors with information
but which, usually deliberately, were left without precise identification. Resident
ambassadors from all states referred cryptically to their sources in Rome. On occasion they might be identified by provenance, such as venetiano or genovosino107 or
by their status, such as ecclesiastico, courtiere or soldato. More frequently the labels
preserved an even more obscure anonymity. There were amici, uomini buoni e de
bone fide, persona de autorità 108, persona digna 109, uno amico mio 110, uno notabile
homo 111 with whom they established relationships at the Roman court. These vague
appellations left the flesh and blood individuals in the shadows. It is quite possible
that some of these individuals were paid informants, although evidence of such arrangements almost never appears in the dispatches. Giovanni Bianchi was typical
among ambassadors when he regularly learned about what happened in secret
papal consistories from an unnamed cardinal—he would only describe him in his
dispatches as un reverendissimo cardenale partesano de la Vostra Excellentia.112 But
the language might even be more discreet than a reference to a particular individual.
As at other courts, ambassadors in Rome wrote of receiving information da buon
luogo113 or per bona via114, phrases that periphrastically could describe nearly anyone
or anywhere. Such unnamed sources and connections were an important tool in
gathering information and gaining insight into the intentions of the pope. Perhaps it
was Nicodemo Tranchedini who put it most succinctly when he informed the Duke
of Milan that he expected Paul, in 1471, to name new cardinals, as he had talked to
someone who “knew quite a lot about the mind of the pope.”115

This examination of the experiences of resident ambassadors in Rome under
Pope Paul II testifies to important features both of diplomatic representation and
of the make-up of the papal court in the second half of the fifteenth century. Resident ambassadors at the Curia, as was the case for ambassadors stationed in Milan,
Venice, and other courts that saw heavy traffic of visitors and news from abroad,
were valued largely for their capacity to gather and report information. In Rome,
of course, residents were also tasked with the complicated and time-consuming
business of politicking with the pope, and those who might influence the pope, over
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ecclesiastical appointments. In pursuing both tasks, direct or indirect access to the
pope was paramount—hence the great importance placed on cultivating a range of
sources and connections that spanned the population of the Curia.
In Rome there was a broad and varied market for the commodity of information.
As in a commodity market, there were grades of product, which were more or less
difficult to extract. Like market-savvy entrepreneurs, competent resident ambassadors sought to use every resource at their disposal to secure good product. The
complex nature of the papal court, with its unique polyvalent structure, mixture of
personnel and nationalities and dual secular and ecclesiastical identities, provided
any number of avenues for such information gathering. The most important information concerned the outlook and intentions of the pope, of course, and ambassadors
were rarely able to avail themselves directly of the pope’s outlook. Often they were
furnished only with fragmentary or carefully filtered information from the pope
and his immediate circle. Given the challenges thrown up by Paul II, resident ambassadors were forced to be flexible, creative, and dogged in their efforts to know
the mind of the pope.
The travails of ambassadors resident in Paul II’s Rome also tell us much about
the increasingly mundane and local preoccupations of the fifteenth-century papacy.
Paul II, in a fashion characteristic of Renaissance popes, expended a very large
portion of his time and efforts on secular and local, territorial concerns. While the
regular flow of visitors from across western Christendom provided reminders of
the universal claims and responsibilities of papal authority, the scope of Paul II’s
vision was on a day-to-day basis considerably more confined. In regards to affairs in
France, for example, Paul as pope spent a disproportionate amount of time cultivating the political ambitions of John of Anjou toward the Kingdom of Naples. In this
fashion, the papal court, despite its unique profile and dimensions (which shaped
ambassadors’ tasks in important ways), came to resemble closely princely courts
elsewhere in Italy. In many areas, Paul II acted in a manner scarcely distinguishable from the Duke of Milan or King of Naples. Even the factional divisions in the
cardinalate mirrored the rivalries present among court nobilities at other Italian
courts. And while ambassadors did expend many hours on ecclesiastical affairs at
the papal court, recommending candidates for curial offices and vacant benefices,
their tasks in Rome resembled closely those of ambassadors who served at other
Italian courts: carrying out political negotiations, monitoring relations with the
prince, and, above all, collecting information. It is therefore not surprising that
many of the ambassadors who served as resident ambassadors in Rome also served
as ambassadors at other times at other courts; the skills required were very much
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the same. It is also telling that very few of the ambassadors assigned to the Curia
were churchmen; their concern for the affairs of the church was clearly secondary
to their tasks in Rome.116
In the politicized papal monarchy of the second half of the fifteenth century,
where the character and ambitions of the individual who served as pontiff eclipsed
the interests of the institution, it was inevitable that the personal would become
political. We have seen that the pretensions and personality of Pope Paul II presented considerable challenges to ambassadors resident at the papal court, forcing
them to employ manifold means and avenues to “know the mind of the pope.” It
was an experience that produced a great deal of infelicity among this fellowship of
diplomats, and produced in their dispatches shockingly candid barbs directed at
the pope. It is likely that many of these ambassadors would have agreed with the
sentiments expressed by Giovanni Bentivoglio (1443–1508), the lord of the commune in Bologna and one who had numerous run-ins with the late pope, in a letter
to Lorenzo de’ Medici, shortly after Giovanni learned of Paul’s death: “I pray to
God that He might give us a better pope.”117
Notes
1. The imagery of concentricity is significantly preferable to that of a pyramid, which
suggests a strictly layered hierarchy, and understates the complexity and fluidity of
the papal court’s social topography. Ambassadors often found that their most useful
connections might not inhabit the highest levels of such a hierarchy.
2. See, for example: Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1956), pp. 51–111; Michael Mallett, “Diplomacy and War in Later FifteenthCentury Italy,” Proceedings of the British Academy LXVII (1981), pp. 267–88; and R. Fubini, “Diplomacy and government in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth century,”
in Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy, ed. Daniela Frigo, trans. A. Belton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 26–48.
3. Instructions from Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Bianca Maria Sforza to Agostino Rossi
and Lorenzo da Pesaro, 25 November 1466, Milan, Archivio di Stato di Milano (hereafter ASMi), Archivio Sforzesco (hereafter AS), Potenze Estere (hereafter PE)—Roma,
Cart. 61: “con le orrechie tese et con li occhi al penello per intendere tutti li disegni
et movimenti et concepti del dicto Bartolomeo et de ogni altro loco de Italia et de
quanto sentiremo de tutto aviseremovi.” This translation, and all subsequent translations from archival documents, are my own.
4. Borso d’Este to Jacopo Trotti, 4 April 1468, Benvignanti, Archivio di Stato di Modena
(hereafter ASMo), Archivio Segreto Estense (hereafter ASE), Carteggio Ambasciatori
(herafter CA)—Roma, b.1: “[tu] ne scrivi tante cosse che pothamo quasi dire de es-
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sere a Roma, tanto distinctamente et ordinamente tu ne le dici e chiarissi…. commendiamote del tuo scrivere perch’el ni ha dato tanto contexto che ni non poteristi
crederlo perché tu ne sigilli le cosse che le tochiamo cum mano et che le intendiamo,
come se li fossemo presenti.”
Calcagnino de Calignini to Borso d’Este, 28 June 1470, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma,
b.1: “Da Jacomo Trotto qui intende el cocto et el crudo de le occurentie et de Italia et
fuor de Italia.” Calcagnino was a scion of a prominent Ferrarese family sent to Rome
as an envoy by Duke Borso.
See the letter of Borso d’Este to Jacopo Trotti, 29 April 1468, Consandali, ASMo, ASE,
CA—Roma, b.1: “Et de quello habia parlato cum te la Santità del Papa, cardinali, et
altri ambassatori ne sono piazute summamente et havemo recevute piacere intenderle.”
The translation provided is from C. Celenza, Renaissance Humanism and the Papal
Curia: Lapo da Castiglionicho the Younger’s De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 139: “Existimo igitur Aristotelem Homeri poesim
legisse atque illum imitatum esse, qui, cum in Ulyxis persona prudentem virum fingere vellet, sic scripsit: “Varias iactatus in oras et mores hominum multorum novit
et urbes;” eadem videlicet erroris longitudine et varietate locorum atque hominum
notavit. Huius preciosissimae rei consequendae gratia numquam ego cuiquam Calypsen, Circem, Phaeces, Lystrigones, Syrenas, Ciclopes, inferos ut Ulyxi petendos
censuerim. Nam quae ille diuturno errore, summo vitae discrimine consequutus est,
haec omnia abunde tibi Romana curia suppenditabit. In ea enim una rerum multitudinem, varietatem hominum, magnitudinem causarum reperias. Nihil enim fere
maximum inter Christianos agitur, de quo non consulatur pontifex maximus, in quo
non eius interponatur auctoritas. Sive enim de bello sive de pace sive de foederibus
ineundis sive de matrimoniis inter summos orbis reges et principes deliberatur sive
aliqua inter eos vertitur controversia, cuncta ad illum deferuntur et in curia ut in
publico aliquo foro agitantur. Itaque necesse est eum qui in hac tanta frequentia versetur rerum atque hominum multa videre, multa audire, multa discere, multa etiam
ipsum agere, plurimorum item nec vulgarium nec imperitorum hominum colloquio,
sermone, et consuetudine uti, plurimorum mores et vitae instituta agnoscere, cum
nonnullis etiam familiaritates amicitiasque coniungere. Ex quibus omnibus sibi
quod libeat probandi, improbandi, legendi, reiiciendi, dimittendi, sumendi, corrigendi, emendandive potestas permittur, ut, tametsi natura hebetior sit, modo non
negligens, paulo tamen diutius tritus in curia et sub actus summo saepe viros ingenio
superet.”
A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1972), p. 318.
See D. Hay, The Church in Italy in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 41–48. See also Barbara Hallman, Italian Cardinals, Reform
and the Church as Property, 1492–1563 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985),
pp. 4–5.
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10. According to Charles Stinger, between the pontificates of Pius II (1458–1464) and
Leo X (1513–1521), the number of individuals in the papal household quadrupled to
over 2000. The Renaissance in Rome (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1985), p. 333.
11. G. Signorotto and M.A. Visceglia, ed., Court and Politics in Papal Rome 1492–1700
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 1 in the “Introduction.”
12. Signorotto, p. 6.
13. Antonio Guidobono to Francesco Sforza, 8 July 1457, quoted in Elizabeth Mahnke,
“The Political Career of a Condottiere-Prince: Ludovico Gonzaga 1444–1466,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1974, p. 205.
14. L’Albergo was published in 1637 (Venice). Cited in M. Infelise, “Roman Avvisi: Information and Politics in the Seventeenth Century” in Signorotto, ed., Court and Politics,
p. 213 (whole essay, pp. 212–228).
15. Nicodemo made this remark when trying to find out whether there was truth to the
rumor he had heard from the Cardinal of Naples, Oliviero Carafa, that the pope was
arranging the marriage of his nephew to the daughter of the King of Naples, Ferrante.
Letter to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 10 July 1471, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 67.
16. J. Heers, La vie quotidienne à la cour pontificale au temps des Borgia et des Médicis 1420–
1520 (Paris: Hachette, 1986), p. 28.
17. On Pietro Barbo’s career as a cardinal, see I. Robertson, “Pietro Barbo: Zentilhomo
de Venecia e Pontifico,” in War, Culture and Society in Renaissance Venice. Essays in Honour of John Hale, ed. D. Chambers, C. Clough, and M. Mallett (London: Hambledon
Press, 1993), pp. 151–57 (whole essay pp. 147–172).
18. Massimo Miglio makes this point in La storiografia pontificia del Quattrocento (Bologna: Pàtron, 1975), p. 121.
19. Platina, The Lives of the Popes from the Accession of Gregory VII to the Death of Paul
II, trans. and ed. W. Benham (London: Griffith, Farran, Okeden and Welsh, 1887),
p. 278. For an interesting treatment of the publication life of the Lives, see S. Bauer,
The Censorship and Fortuna of Platina’s Lives of the Popes in the Sixteenth Century
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).
20. J. D’Amico, Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome. Humanists and Churchmen on the
Eve of the Reformation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 92.
21. D’Amico, p. 296.
22. Miglio, p. 112. “Platina dipinge un quadro spaventole degli ipocriti e dell’ipocrisia …
egli volle ad ogni costo farla rappresentare quale duello tra lui ed il Papa suo nemico
personale.”
23. V. Zabughin, Giulio Pomponio Leto. Saggio Critico, Volume I (Rome: La vita literaria,
1909), p. 67.
24. See especially R. Weiss, Un umanista veneziano. Papa Paolo II. Civiltà VenezianaSaggi, 4 (Rome: Istituto per la Collaborazione Culturale, 1958), pp. 9–32. For more
specifically on the so-called conspiracy, see A.J. Dunston, “Pope Paul II and the
Humanists,” The Journal of Religious History 7 (1973), pp. 287–306 and P. Medioli
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34.
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Masotti, “L’Accademia Romana e la congiura del 1468,” Italia medioevale e umanistica 25 (1982), pp. 189–204. The near-contemporary biographer Gaspare da Verona
also sought to counter the accusations of the Roman Academicians that Paul was an
enemy of learning. Gaspare wrote: “He is praised to the skies by all mortal men as the
founder, reformer, and benefactor of institutions of learning: indeed, his good name
knows no bounds, and all men praise him with great acclamations.” A. Andrews,
“The ‘Lost’ Fifth Book of Gaspare da Verona,” Studies in the Renaissance 17 (1970), p. 41
(whole article, pp. 7–45).
Robertson, “Pietro Barbo,” p. 149.
On Bologna, see I. Robertson, Tyranny under the Mantle of St. Peter: Pope Paul II and
Bologna (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), especially pp. 5–22 and 139–44. Giovanni Bianchi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 27 January 1468, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 64:
‘de subiugarsi tutte le terre de la chiesa, che immediate non gli sono sottoposte.”
Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 21 September 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, B.1:
“Insignoriarse de tuta Romagna.” Jacopo wrote this observation in code.
Galeazzo Maria Sforza to Pietro Archangelo and Gerardo Cerutti, 8 May 1469, Rome,
ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 66.
I. Robertson, “The Return of Cesena to the Direct Dominion of the Church after the
Death of Malatesta Novello,” Studi Romagnoli 16 (1965), pp. 123–61.
R. Fubini, Italia Quattrocentesca (Florence: F. Angeli, 1994), p. 269.
Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 14 April 1469, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, B.1: “Confesso e credo ch’el non facia tante cosse quanto sua Beatitudine dice, ma dico ch’el
Re l’ha ingiurato sino nel cuore et mostrato non il stimare niente, che è la magior ingiuria che si possa fare a un Signore glorioso, pomposo, et ambitioso come è il nostro
Papa.”
Giovanni Bianchi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 27 January 1468, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 64: “È opinione de parecchi qua, etiam de capelli rossi, che ogni studio,
opera et diligentia del papa miri et tendi ad farsi et mantenersi iudice dele appelatione
in Italia et per consequens fuori d’Italia. Et ch’el se persuade gli debba reussire per
havergli fin qui dato assai bon principio et per havere reputatione appresso ognuno
ch’el sii richissimo et potentissimo. Et che tutto faci per lassare de se questa laude et
gloria, cioè che l’habiy possuto disponere et fare et dire ad suo per essere stati ad li
loro tempi de li principi che non gli l’hanno voluto consentire.”
Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 28 January 1468, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 64: “Al mio iuditio la sua Sta sta in questo pensiero de redur a si tute le terre
de la giesia, et tutti li altri vicariy e feudatoriy suoy. Ita che non habiano dependentia
ni concometantia con altri che con essa. Et di l’altra parte non dovea etiamo dio che
veruna de la potentie ytalice multiplicasse, ni cresessi più che la se sia. Et in quella
forma esser sua Beatudine quella a chi se drizaseno tute cose, et dar leze ad ogniuno
in temporale e spirituale.”
Letter of 28 August 1465, cited in P. Farenga, “‘I Romani sono periculoso populo’
Roma nei carteggi diplomatici” in Roma Capitale (1447–1527), ed. S. Gensini (Rome:
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35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, 1994), p. 311 (whole essay, pp. 289–315). “Il
papa vuol essere obedito.”
Quoted in E. Pontieri, L’età d’equilibrio politico in Italia (1454–1494) (Naples: Libreria
Scientifica Editrice, 1962), p. 272. “Per mia pari fa che la auctorità si distribuischa et se
potessi esser sanza scandolo sarebbono meglo tre o quatro Papa che uno.”
M. Pellegrini, “A turning-point in the history of the factional system in the Sacred
College: the power of the Pope and cardinals in the age of Alexander VI,” in Signorotto and Visceglia, ed., p. 22 (whole essay, pp. 8–30). See also P. Richard, “Origines et
développement de la Sécretarie d’Etat apostolique (1417–1823),” Revue d’Histoire Écclesiastique 11 (1910), pp. 56–72.
Paul apparently considered taking the name Formosus as pope, but decided against
it, thinking that the name might be associated with his good looks. The original Pope
Formosus was pontiff 891–896. In 897, his body was exhumed by Pope Stephen VI.
In what became known as the Cadaver Synod, Formosus’s body was dressed in full
vestments, propped up on a throne and subjected to a mock trial. Formosus was posthumously declared unfit for office, his acts and decrees vacated, and his corpse tossed
into the Tiber.
That the former Pietro Barbo chose the name Paul instead, however, is telling.
There had not been a Pope Paul since Paul I in the eighth century. That pope was
known primarily for his success in consolidating the territorial papal state and for
facing up to the Lombard King Desiderius. See T.F.X. Noble, The Republic of St. Peter.
The Birth of the Papal State, 680–825 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1984), esp. pp. 103–112; and D.H. Miller, “Papal-Lombard Relations During the Pontificate of Pope Paul I: The Attainment of an Equilibrium of Power in Italy, 756–767,”
Catholic Historical Review 55 (1969), pp. 358–76. Pietro Barbo may very well have had
the model of this pope in mind while making his onomastic determinations. And, of
course, the name Paul referenced the Apostle Paul, who was often characterized as
the protector of the church and represented in iconography as a sword. Both of these
models may very well say something of Paul II’s designs for his own papacy. I thank
Stephen Bartlett for alerting me to the significance of such a choice of names.
M. Simonetta and M. Meserve, ed., Commentaries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). At Book 1.34.5 (p. 173), Pius calls him “less a master of ceremonies
than an expert seeker of worldly preferment.” At Book 2.8.1–6 (pp. 239–241), Pius
recounts the great affront taken by the Cardinal when he did not receive the benefice
of Santa Maria in Impruneta, a wealthy parish by virtue of the many pilgrims who
visited there.
Agostino Rossi to Cicco Simonetta, 3 November 1466, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma,
Cart. 61: “Ma si bene ch’el non ne fosse ancora più attenti li modi et la pompa intollerabile de tutta questa corte , et maxime che’l Papa tutto’l dì sta in numerare et asortire
dinari et in filare perle loco di poter nostri.”
Paul’s reputation for hoarding money was already being talked about outside of
Rome by the end of 1464. Vincenzo della Scalona, the Mantuan ambassador in Milan,
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reported on 4 December 1464 in a letter to the Marquis Ludovico Gonzaga that he
had heard: “La Santità Sua fu dicto che ha principiato de acumullare dinari.” M.N.
Covini, ed., Carteggio degli oratori mantovani alla corte sforzesco (1450–1500), vol. 6
(Rome: Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali, 1999), p. 529.
L. von Pastor, The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages, vol. 4, ed. F.I.
Antrobus (London: Kegan Paul, 1910), p. 25.
Pellegrini, p. 9ff.
Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Bianca Maria Sforza, 4 November 1466,
Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 61.
Pastor, p. 106.
Jacopo Filippo Doivo to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 8 May 1471, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 67. “Con questo pontefice bisogna usare el mele et non lo aceto.”
John D’Amico writes of Paul: “He could be testy and was not universally liked. His
uncle Eugenius IV had helped him advance in the ecclesiastical establishment and he
seems to have developed some of the arrogance of the well placed. Supremely confident of his own views, he brooked no opposition from any quarter.” D’Amico, p. 93.
Agostino reporting the words of the newly arrived Lorenzo da Pesaro. Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Bianca Maria Sforza, 4 November 1466, Rome, ASMi,
AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 61. “Non da audientia a persona viva.”
Pastor, p. 26.
Giovan Pietro Arrivabene to Barbara Gonzaga, 3 October 1464, Rome, Archivio di
Stato di Mantova (hereafter ASMa), Archivio Gonzaga (hereafter AG), Affari Esteri
(hereafter AE)—Roma, b.842. “Gia molti comunicano a duolersi de questo papa, el
qual universalmente ad ugniuno è despiacevole et inhumano et tra l’altre cose difficillimo a le audientie.”
Pastor, p. 26.
For example see the letter of Jacopo d’Arezzo to Barbara Gonzaga, 18 March 1466,
Rome, ASMa, AG, AE—Roma, b.843.
Jacopo d’Arezzo to Barbara, 9 July 1466, Rome, ASMa, AG, AE—Roma, b.843: Jacopo
reported on a consistory beginning after dark and extending well into the morning.
Dunston, p. 290.
Jacopo to Borso, 16 December 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1.
Otto da Caretto to Francesco Sforza, 11 September 1464, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma,
Cart. 56: “Lo costume di Sua Sta è essere molto longo in suo ragionare et non molto
composito, siché li suoy ragionamenti, non si ponno molto ordinatamente referire.”
Agostino Rossi to Dukes, 15 November 1466, Rome, ASMi, AS. PE—Roma, Cart. 61:
“varii, longhi et molti rasonamenti de le cose de Italia.”
Nicodemo and Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 19 May 1471, Rome, ASMi,
AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 67. On 27 September 1469, Jacopo Trotti arrived at the Camera di Pappagallo, where many papal audiences took place, and to his surprise was
summoned first, even though Cardinal Marco Barbo, the ambassadors of the King
of Spain, the Venetian ambassador, the ambassador of Duke John of Anjou, and the
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Bishop of Arly were all present, also waiting to be called upon by the pope. The pope
complained of the failure of Venice to mobilize troops and of Roberto Malatesta seizing additional fortresses around Rimini. Jacopo added “as is his custom, he said a lot.”
ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1.
Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 20 August 1467, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 63.
Jacopo d’Arezzo to Barbara Gonzaga, 21 May 1465, Rome, ASMa, AG, AE—Roma,
b.842.
Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 30 July 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1.
Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 48 April 1470, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1.
Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 24 August 1467, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1. .: “Il non
delibera per alcun modo mai lassare forlì come il sta a presente, sotto la protectione
de venetiani; et che più tosto el doventaria zudio et turcho per modo parlare, che mai
mai deviare da questa voglia, et patire tanta infamia, tanto charico, et tanta vergogna,
che un suo vacario fratricidia et matricidia tristo et cussì gran ribaldo, se gli ribelli et
faccia beffe de soa Sanctità, et non lo stimi un ficco per ombra ch’el habia de essere in
protectione de venetiani.”
As reported by Jacopo Trotti, 20 July 1467: “questo landrocello bastardo del re.”
Nicodemo Tranchedini to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 31 October 1469, Rome, ASMi, AS,
PE—Roma, Cart. 66.
Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 5 September 1467, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 63. “Non lo vite may ni più alterato ni più turbato.”
Giovanni Bianchi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 5 January 1468, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 64.
Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 19 November 1467, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 63.
Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 24 May 1468, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1.:
“questo meschino de messer Lorenzo, a chi in vero ognomo ha compassione assai.” In
fact things got even worse for Lorenzo, as the notoriously mercurial Galeazzo Maria
refused to correspond with him, choosing instead to communicate with individual
cardinals such as Niccolò Fortiguerra, as well as with the ambassadors of Florence
and Naples.
Jacopo to Borso d’Este, 8 September 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA, Roma, B.1: “non
pigliati mai passione de cossa che dica nostro Signore a mi contra de VS … perché il
fa et dice molto pegio contra altri.”
Jacopo to Borso d’Este, 9 August 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, b.1: “Non scio
mò ciò che soa Beatudine faria, perché la non fa le cosse sue molto in fretta, et non
vene cussì presto a la conclusione.”
Agostino Rossi to Bianca Maria Sforza, 6 December 1466, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 61: “gli pare uno bel zoco de stare così indiferente et neutrale, non
mostrando essere di qua ni de là, solo per essere il maestro del tutto et potere sbatere
l’uno per l’altro.”
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71. Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 21 January 1468, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 64: “Per lequal tute cosse nuy altri, non sapemo que sa dire, se non
marevigliarse grandmente de tanta varietà et mutatione del papa: che antea sempre
habia calumpniato venetiani, et modo li comendi; che sempre se sia facto beffe de le
domande de Bartholomeo, e adesso voglia se li debia satisfar; che de preterito anche
habia tuta via de voler favorezar la iustitia, e la parte vostra, e me para altramente,
monstrando più presto l’opposito.”
72. Agostino Rossi to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 18 January 1468, Rome, ASmi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 64: “L’è vero, signore mio, che questo nostro sancto patre, a le volte, ha
de stranie et varie opinione. E nuy altri che siano qua, havemo a navigar uno mare
molto fluctuanti che va per fluxo et per refluxo.”
73. Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 25 February 1470, Rome, ASMo, ASE, CA—Roma, B.1.
74. “Discourse on the Affairs of Germany and its Emperor,” in The Essential Writings of
Machiavelli, ed. and trans. P. Constantine (New York: Modern Library, 2007), p. 374
(whole extract, pp. 373–374).
75. W. Tommasoli, Momenti e figure della politica dell’equilibrio (Federico da Montefeltro e
l’impresa di Rimini) (Urbino: Argalìa Editore, 1968), p. 6. “fiacco e confuso che rispecchiò il modo d’essere d’un papa indeciso nell’azione anche se accentratore del potere.”
76. As reported in a letter of Otto da Caretto to Francesco Sforza, 12 September 1464,
Rome, ASMi, AS, PE–Roma, Cart. 56: “in vero questo papa di sua natura è molto sospitioso et benché fazi bon mercato de parole molto larghe verso di Vostra Excellentia,
non sapemo ancor bene come ello se fidi.”
77. Otto da Caretto to Francesco Sforza, 24 October 1464, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE–Roma,
Cart. 56: “ … yo cominciò a pigliare questa opinione di sua Sta: che habbi questa per
una bella arte de dare belle parole senza effecto.”
78. Lorenzo da Pesaro to Francesco Sforza, 27 October 1464, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma,
Cart. 56: “Per certo sua Sta parla molto bene ma le parole sono diverse dalli facti.”
79. It was only under Innocent VIII and Alexander VI when protectorships were openly
admitted by the popes. See W.E. Wilkie, The Cardinal Protectors of England: Rome
and the Tudors before the Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1974), pp. 8–9.
80. These words reported in a letter from Bartolomeo Marasca to Ludovico Gonzaga, 17
October 1464, Rome, ASMa, AG, AE—Roma, b.842. “[N]on ha bono stomacho Gonzhaga.”
81. Ammannati especially resented Paul’s love of luxury and fondness for fine art. He
wrote: “Pontifex Paule est tibi ut video: magna aeternitas cupido. Praedicare de te
optas sequentia saecula!” Cited in Zabughin, pp. 92–93. Masotti has noted that several of the alleged plotters of the 1468 humanist “conspiracy” against Paul II were
familiars of Pieschi cardinals: Petreio of Ammannati, Platina of Gonzaga, and Glauco Condulmer of Roverella. Masotti, p. 190.
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82. In November 1470, Lorenzo de’ Medici sent Gentile Becchi to the Curia, and he
drew upon the support of Cardinal Ammanati in negotiating his way around the
curial landscape. L. de’ Medici, Lettere, vol. II, ed. R. Fubini (Florence; Giunti, 1977),
p. 237.
83. Agostino Rossi to Francesco Sforza, 22 June 1465, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—Roma,
Cart. 57.
84. Jacopo d’Arezzo to Barbara Gonzaga, 9 July 1466, Rome, ASMa, AG, AE—Roma,
b.843.
85. Among many examples, Jacopo Trotti wrote on 27 September 1469 that he had asked
the pope “che non vesperiasse tanto il ambassatori [of Venice] che havessero a stare
malcontenti e de mala voglia.” They were upset because the pope was repeatedly
criticizing Venice for its failure to aid in the pope’s Rimini campaign, and because
they believed his threat to call upon John of Anjou to be a “pacia.” ASMo, ASE, CA—
Roma, B. 1.
86. Lettere, vol. II, p. 119. Letter to Lorenzo de’ Medici of 7 April 1470: “in secreto è pocho
amore, immo ranchore assai.” For more on the strained relations between Venice and
Paul as pope, see I. Robertson, “Pietro Barbo,” pp. 157–71.
87. Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 19 September 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, AE—Roma, b.1:
“lo occhio destro del Papa.”
88. Andrews, p. 39.
89. On the capitulation, see P. Partner, The pope’s men: the papal civil service in the Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 35.
90. G. Chittolini, “Introduction” in G. Sensini, ed., Roma capitale (1447–1527) (Rome:
Ministero per I beni culturali e ambientali, 1994), p. 2.
91. Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 24 September 1468, Rome, ASMo, ASE, AE—Roma, b.1.
“ … littere freschissime da Franza.”
92. Jacopo Trotti to Borso d’Este, 27 September 1467, Rome, ASMo, ASE, AE—Roma, b.1.
93. Antonio da Bracello to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 1 March 1471, Rome, ASMi, AS, PE—
Roma, Cart. 67.
94. See, for example, Lorenzo da Pesaro to Dukes of Milan, 10 December 1466, Rome,
ASMi, AS, PE—Roma, Cart. 61. Lorenzo and Agostino Rossi spent four hours with the
Cardinal of Pavia, who gave them an exhaustive report of all he had heard concerning
the machinations of Bartolomeo Colleoni, and the plight of Scanderbeg in his fight
against the Turks in Albania (whose plight he described as “desperato”).
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